PROVISIONAL

For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.1
28 August 1990

Original: ENGLISH

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 1st MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 20 August 1990, at 3 p.m.

Acting President: Mr. ADEYEMI (Nigeria)

President: Mr. de RIVERO (Peru)

CONTENTS

Opening of the Conference by the Chairman of the third session of the Preparatory Committee and submission of the final report of the Preparatory Committee

Election of the President

Message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations

Statement by the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency

Adoption of the rules of procedure

Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee

Election of Vice-Presidents

Confirmation of the nomination of the Secretary-General

Adoption of the agenda

Programme of work

Adoption of arrangements for meeting the costs of the Conference

---

Corrections to this record should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent within one week of the date of this document to the Official Records Editing Section, room E.4108, Palais des Nations, Geneva.

GE.90-66003/2309B

The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE THIRD SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE (agenda item 1) AND SUBMISSION OF THE FINAL REPORT OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE (agenda item 3) (NPT/CONF.IV/1)

The Acting PRESIDENT, in his capacity as Chairman of the third session of the Preparatory Committee, declared open the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Conference had been convened in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, a proposal made during the Third Review Conference, and General Assembly resolution 43/82. The significant increase in the number of States Parties to the Treaty since the Third Review Conference, in 1985, was convincing evidence of the great importance attached to the need to ensure non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Since 1985, actual reductions in nuclear weapons had been achieved for the first time as the result of a negotiated agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States. The international community was now awaiting the finalization of an agreement between the two major nuclear-weapon Powers concerning the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. Yet there continued to be very serious concern that not enough had been done, or seemed likely to be done, to proceed towards the complete elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. With those issues in mind, and taking into account the review of the Treaty's future that was to take place in 1995, it was of the utmost importance for the Conference to reaffirm its strong commitment to the purposes of the Treaty's preamble and provisions.

Introducing the final report of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.III/1), he said that the Committee had held three sessions, with 106 States Parties - or 36 more States Parties than the number that had taken part in the preparatory phase of the Third Review Conference - participating in the work of one or more of the sessions. The Preparatory Committee had adopted its final report on 2 May 1990.

ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT (agenda item 2)

The Acting PRESIDENT drew attention to the statement in paragraph 15 of the final report that the Preparatory Committee had unanimously decided to recommend Mr. de Rivero (Peru) as President of the Fourth Review Conference. He now wished to place the recommendation formally before the Conference for its approval.

Mr. de Rivero (Peru) was elected President of the Conference by acclamation.

The PRESIDENT said that he regarded the election of Peru to the presidency of the Conference as an acknowledgement of Latin America's pioneering action in support of the banning of nuclear weapons, as attested, in particular, by the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco establishing the world's first nuclear-weapon-free zone. On behalf of his country and his region, he wished to thank all delegations and to pay tribute to his distinguished predecessors, who had so ably conducted the work of the earlier Review Conferences.

The ending of the cold war meant that the traditional view of international security based exclusively on ideological and military factors had to be replaced by a concept which encompassed the elimination of critical poverty throughout the world, the preservation of the environment and the protection of human rights, as well as disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation - in other words, a global and planetary view of security. The Conference was taking place within a political and strategic context entirely different from that of the three previous Review Conferences, which had been characterized by East-West confrontation. The Conference should not fail to take advantage of the opportunity thus offered and should consolidate and develop the non-proliferation régime as a political and legal institution essential to the restructuring of international relations now taking place.

A first agreement on the elimination of nuclear weapons had been concluded since the Third Review Conference of 1985, and negotiations for the elimination of other categories of weapons were under way. Those advances were an important first step towards fulfilment of the responsibilities which the NPT imposed on the nuclear-weapon States, and it was to be hoped that the process would continue apace. The non-nuclear-weapon States Parties, for their part, had succeeded in remaining on the sidelines of the nuclear weapons race, their rejection of the nuclear option bearing witness to a more profound

and more generous concept of national and international security involving a decision to channel resources towards eliminating poverty and preserving the environment rather than towards producing nuclear weapons.

The NPT had come into being as a product of the twentieth century, a century of wars and ideological struggle. It was for the participants in the Conference to convert the NPT into a citizen of the twenty-first century, which would surely be a century of peace.

MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. AKASHI (Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs) read out the following message to the Conference from the Secretary-General of the United Nations:

"The close of the 1980s has heralded an end to the cold war and to the escalating arms race between the major Powers that prevailed for 45 years after the Second World War.

The momentous changes in the world, particularly in East-West relationships, have diminished the threat of nuclear confrontation and made it possible to initiate and pursue a process of real reduction in nuclear weapons. The first agreement for actual reductions in nuclear weapons, the Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Elimination of their Intermediate Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, was signed in 1987. The international community has also welcomed the agreement in June 1990 between the USSR and the United States on the framework of a START treaty on the reduction of strategic arms, and looks forward with keen anticipation to the completion of that agreement and to its full implementation.

The entire international community has long been convinced that a major nuclear war would be catastrophic for life on this planet. In the spirit of this conviction, the nuclear-weapon Powers have demonstrated, especially during the last decade, their increased determination to avoid a nuclear conflict. Now, negotiations to reduce nuclear arms have been supplemented by a reassessment of the military doctrines of the two major armed alliances. As a consequence, the arms race and military confrontation between them are giving way to disarmament agreements and confidence-building measures. There have also been important steps toward a widely anticipated agreement on conventional forces in Europe and intensive work on the completion of a chemical weapons convention.

While these positive developments in international relations must be sustained, there is a long road before us. Further substantive measures of nuclear disarmament remain a priority for the international community and must be realized.

In this wider process of nuclear arms limitation, the non-proliferation régime has played and will continue to play a critical role. The nuclear non-proliferation Treaty is central to this régime. Generally recognized as a landmark Treaty, it is the international arms limitation instrument most widely observed. No States have withdrawn from the non-proliferation Treaty and no party has been found to be violating its provisions.

It should be noted, however, that the Treaty imposes asymmetrical obligations on its two groups of States Parties, the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States. In such circumstances, it is of the utmost importance that all its parties should discharge their responsibilities in good faith and to the full. This commitment calls for, among other elements, clear assurances about the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and for energetic endeavours to end all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. At the same time, the right of States to develop nuclear technology for economic benefit must be both assured and reconciled with the overriding need to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons.

Indeed, concern about nuclear weapons proliferation remains acute, particularly in the light of technological developments which could facilitate the development of a nuclear-weapon capability by additional States. Therefore the strict observance of the nuclear non-proliferation régime is of fundamental importance. Wider participation in the international non-proliferation régime is equally vital. This régime would also be strengthened if States Parties to the NPT that have not already done so concluded the requisite safeguard agreements with IAEA.

This Fourth Review Conference is the last one before the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty decide in 1995 'whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods'. Thus, this Conference will do much to determine the future and success of non-proliferation. Your review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty must, therefore, in particular provide a strong impetus and effective support to global and regional efforts to

implement fully the Treaty's objectives. I send you my best wishes for every success in your work, whose consequences can affect the whole world."

STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

Mr. BLIX (Director-General, International Atomic Energy Agency) said that the Conference was taking place at a moment of dangerous confrontation in a strategic region of the world. Although the attention of Governments was necessarily focused on day-to-day developments in the situation, full consideration had to be given to the central topic before the Conference, that of ensuring that nuclear weapons were not acquired by further States, as well as to the closely linked topics of nuclear disarmament and the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology. The present conflict provided a stark illustration of the dangers inherent in arms races and armed conflict in the absence of mutual confidence and stability built up by accommodation, co-operation and verified arms control. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was already rendering vital service in many regions of the world towards creating such confidence and stability. Its principal shortcoming resided in its failure thus far to fulfil the aspirations towards universality and nuclear disarmament. Intense efforts would have to be made in both those respects before the crucial Review Conference of 1995.

The international scene had undergone tremendous change since the Third Review Conference. On the negative side, threats to the global environment had dramatically increased. Action was required in order to stabilize the world's population, channel additional resources towards development, reduce dependence on fossil fuels and expand the role of energy sources, including nuclear power, which did not threaten the environment. On the positive side, the risk of military confrontation between East and West was currently giving way to opportunities for expanded co-operation, including peaceful nuclear co-operation. Drastically reduced stockpiles of nuclear weapons and dramatically increased international co-operation towards the achievement of uniformly high levels of nuclear-power safety were now realistic aims.

Both the positive and the negative factors were of relevance in reviewing the NPT. Frustration due to the slow progress and modest results of disarmament negotiations should give way to the hope that the INF agreement, a START agreement and a CFE agreement would signal the dawn of a peaceful era in which large resources previously locked in arms production might be released for development and global environmental protection, a hope that should serve

to consolidate commitment to the Treaty. Several non-Party States had explained their failure to join the Treaty by referring to the different obligations it imposed upon nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, respectively. As disarmament negotiations began to bear fruit, those objections should be correspondingly reduced.

Another factor, potentially of equally great importance in terms of adherence to the NPT, was that nuclear weapons were beginning to look obsolescent. Although, as the current conflict in the Middle East showed, the emergence of a well-organized international community invariably using peaceful means to settle disputes was still a dream, the philosophy of mutually assured destruction seemed to be giving way to the realization that nuclear weapons offered no solution to security and that accommodation, resolution of regional conflicts and co-operation offered the only way of resolving differences, especially between great Powers. When that realization became universal, the commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament might do likewise. That line of reasoning attributed special persuasive value to the nuclear disarmament measures at present under way as well as those, such as a complete nuclear test ban and cessation of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons, which implied the abandonment of both the qualitative and the quantitative nuclear arms race. Positive results of active co-operation between East and West in defusing regional conflicts could be equally important for non-proliferation, since a peaceful climate lessened interest in nuclear weapons.

As to the role played under the Treaty by the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA safeguards had come a long way, both quantitatively and qualitatively, since their inception, when on-site inspection by an international organization had been a somewhat revolutionary measure causing a variety of misgivings. It would be wrong to say that all reservations had been dissipated; some still remained, and some new difficulties had been encountered. On the whole, however, the safeguards system had achieved maturity and strength. It was respected, recognized as impartial and accepted by all States, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon or Party or non-Party to the NPT. Moreover, the nuclear industry realized that nuclear trade in the world of today would be severely disrupted if the safeguards and the confidence provided by them were to disappear. The fear that safeguards would impede nuclear research and development had been laid to rest, although at times some concern was still voiced in a small number of States about the

cost and burden of safeguards and about the maintenance of commercial and industrial confidentiality. Throughout the system's years of operation, the Agency's Director-General had been able to report every year that he considered it reasonable to conclude that nuclear material under Agency safeguards had remained in peaceful nuclear activities or was otherwise adequately accounted for. That was encouraging but hardly surprising, since States had accepted and invited the safeguards in order to create confidence in their commitment to non-proliferation.

Referring to the background paper prepared by the IAEA on article III of the Treaty (NPT/CONF.IV/12), he said that safeguards agreements were in force with 85 out of the 136 non-nuclear-weapon States Parties. Negotiations for a safeguards agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had been proceeding for some time; the latest round of talks had ended recently, unfortunately without a conclusion satisfactory to all concerned. It had none the less been agreed that contacts would continue and that further efforts would be made to find a satisfactory outcome leading to the conclusion of a safeguards agreement. Periodic reminders were sent to all NPT Parties with outstanding obligations to conclude agreements. The IAEA Secretariat was ready at all times to discuss agreement with those States.

Over the past 20 years the number of facilities under inspection had grown from 156 to over 900. While in 1970 there had been no enrichment plants and only one reprocessing plant under safeguards, there were five of each kind today. In 1970, there had been one small fuel-manufacturing plant under safeguards, but now there were 43. Extensive efforts had been made during the five-year period under review to establish effective safeguards arrangements at plutonium fuel manufacturing plants; one such plant had come into operation during the past five years in Japan.

A number of key improvements had been made with technical and financial support from several Member States and advice from the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation. New technical criteria had been developed which would serve as a basis for safeguards implementation and evaluation. Those criteria would initially be applied from the beginning of 1991 until 1995. Improvements in the quality of safeguards and safeguards implementation had resulted from modifications in the organization of the Safeguards Department. The upgrading of the Agency's offices in Toronto and Tokyo to Regional Offices had led to increased efficiency in the utilization of inspection resources and to improved effectiveness in the safeguards.

The question of optimum utilization of resources was of particular significance when, as was now the case, expanded safeguarding duties had to be reconciled with zero real growth budgets. Efforts on the part of the Agency had to be matched by maximum co-operation on the part of Member States. Objections were sometimes raised in individual countries to the use of some equipment or some new method. Better utilization of Agency resources could also be achieved if less effort had to be expended in connection with the designation and acceptance of inspectors. Since 1988, a simplified procedure had been used on a voluntary basis by 22 States, but ceilings on the number of inspectors and restrictions placed by some countries on whole categories of individuals still complicated the organization of inspection teams and travel arrangements. Cautious acceptance of on-site inspection had been understandable in the system's early days, but today, when inspection was seen as a normal element in agreements on disarmament, arms control and confidence-building measures, Governments might envisage adopting a more relaxed attitude towards impartial international inspection. Ideally, the acceptance of safeguards should be coupled with the acceptance of an inspector's passport issued for inspection trips without any additional visa requirement.

The need for budgetary restraints had prompted various ideas for savings. It had been suggested, for instance, that greater emphasis should be placed on the inspection of bulk-handling facilities and less on that of light-water reactors. The question whether some of the suggestions made could be acted upon without loss of safeguards credibility might perhaps be examined in the future, e.g. in the context of some major expansion of safeguards. At the present time, however, it would not be judicious to make any major modification which could be perceived as a reduction in the effectiveness of safeguards for the sake of economy. Rather, safeguards should be underpinned by increased resources, so as to sustain their reliability, resilience and responsiveness to new challenges. The system's continued success and viability were of vital importance to further reliance on international verification, and to impose severe budgetary restraints on the system would, in his view, be unwise.

Safeguards were a confidence-building measure and should therefore be of a quality which justified and inspired confidence. The annual Safeguards Implementation Report, recently updated and simplified in format and style so

as to make for greater transparence, was a frank evaluation which allowed Member Governments to assess the system's quality. The fact that the Report, which was an important factor in establishing confidence in the system, remained a restricted document was perhaps paradoxical, but misinterpretations - accidental or deliberate - could result from leaks when figures were taken out of context or quoted without adequate explanation.

All the declared nuclear-weapon States had made voluntary offers to accept safeguards. In the case of the United States and the United Kingdom, such offers concerned all nuclear installations designed for peaceful uses, while those of France, the Soviet Union and China related to identified installations in that sector. A certain body of opinion held that inspections under those offers were not very meaningful and that the function of safeguards was to promote confidence about the non-nuclear-weapon status of the country inviting inspection. Clearly, safeguards in nuclear-weapon States could not have that function. But in the unanimous view of the Third NPT Review Conference, the Agency should make wider use of the voluntary offers; the Third Conference had also stressed the principle that all peaceful nuclear installations should be under safeguards in all States. Regrettably, no expansion of safeguards in nuclear-weapon States had been possible under current budgetary constraints.

Inspection in nuclear-weapon States did not affect the important differences in obligations between nuclear-weapon States (NWS) and non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) under the NPT, but it none the less softened to some extent the dichotomy between the large number of closely inspected NNWS on the one hand and the small number of NWS, otherwise exempt from all inspection, on the other. States possessing nuclear weapons were not "rewarded" by having their nuclear installations exempt from the obligation of continuous accounting and periodic visits of inspectors. Furthermore, safeguards under the voluntary offers accustomed NWS to international on-site inspection. They also gave those and other States a useful external check on the accuracy of the national nuclear material accounting and control system. For the IAEA, inspection in NWS had provided inspectors with practical experience in safeguarding types of installations that had later come under safeguards in other countries.

The nuclear disarmament measures taken to date had not had any impact on the operation of safeguards in NWS. However, if enriched uranium or plutonium were to be moved from the military to the peaceful sector as a result of disarmament measures, assurances that that material stayed in the peaceful cycle could be provided by Agency safeguards. Perhaps the NWS could lead the way to a system of international plutonium storage, a system that was contemplated in the IAEA Statute and had already been discussed at length for surplus plutonium originating from the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy.

As far as possible, it would be desirable to use fissionable material recovered through nuclear disarmament measures as safeguarded fuel for generating electricity. The world would undoubtedly feel more at ease if that material was burnt up than if it was stored indefinitely, thus remaining theoretically available for the production of new weapons. It was to be hoped that in their future negotiations, the NWS would consider the potential use of safeguards for materials or installations that were moved into the peaceful nuclear sector either under current or expanded voluntary offers.

The fact that NPT-type safeguards currently predominated did not mean that other methods could not also be worked out, consistent with the Agency Statute, to respond to special requirements that might arise in a disarmament context. That also applied to nuclear-weapon-free zones. The main components of any safeguards régime would undoubtedly be the same, but special needs might call for tailor-made solutions, such as random inspection or permanently stationed inspectors.

Positive results had been recorded in the promotional activities undertaken by the IAEA in accordance with article IV of the NPT. Owing to the substantial increase in IAEA funds for technical assistance and co-operation, those activities had grown greatly during the years under review. The benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were being made available internationally. Whether in agriculture (for example, mutation breeding), industry (non-destructive testing) or medicine (radiation treatment of cancer), use of nuclear techniques was making steady advances. A current dramatic case that deserved special mention was the use of the sterile-insect technique to combat the New World screw-worm in Northern Africa, an infestation which could have tragic consequences if the large-scale project did not succeed.

Reliance on regional mechanisms for the dissemination of nuclear techniques was increasing. The Regional Co-operation Agreement in Asia, long recognized as being of very great practical value, not least in industry, had been followed by the Agreement on Regional Co-operation in Latin America and the recent African Regional Agreement. All would require effective governmental commitment, and additional resources were also vitally needed from the outside. In view of the steady growth in the use of nuclear techniques and radiation sources in developing countries, IAEA was expanding its co-operation there in the fields of safety and waste disposal. With few exceptions, the introduction of non-power nuclear techniques had been well received by the public and experts alike. However, that could change if safety and wastes were not handled responsibly. A few years previously, African States had sounded the alarm that hazardous wastes were being dumped on their territory. He was pleased to announce that no case had been found in which any nuclear waste had been dumped in Africa. The IAEA had drafted a code of practice with strict rules for the international transboundary movement of radioactive waste, but national and international regulatory restrictions were not enough. Positive action was also needed to establish suitable repositories for nuclear wastes arising in developing countries, for example from hospitals. Several accidents in recent years underlined the urgency of such action, to which the IAEA was giving top priority, inter alia through expert missions. Urgent attention was also being devoted to elaborating nuclear safety regulations and creating authorities responsible for supervising them. Many expert missions were also sent for that purpose.

The use of nuclear energy for generating electricity was potentially of tremendous importance for developing countries. The example of the Republic of Korea, where 50 per cent of the electricity was generated by nuclear power, showed how a rapidly developing country could benefit from reliance on nuclear power. By and large, however, such countries had been slow to make use of that alternative. Following a recommendation by the previous Review Conference, the IAEA had set up an expert working group to examine the problems facing those developing countries that wished to use nuclear power. As expected, the financing of large capital-intensive projects in countries with enormous investment needs had been identified as a major problem. However, other bottle-necks relating to the need for industrial infrastructure, a regulatory system and trained manpower had been found to be almost as important.

Over the past five years, a number of new factors had emerged with regard to the use of nuclear power in developing countries. First, the Chernobyl accident of 1986 had had a world-wide psychological impact. Second, although only a few advanced industrialized countries had decided not to use nuclear power, there had nevertheless been conspicuous stagnation in the global growth of nuclear power, partly because of a limited need for additional electricity in many industrialized countries, but also because of public reluctance in many of those countries to accept a further expansion of nuclear power. In such circumstances, it was not surprising that several developing countries, although foreseeing sharply increased needs for electricity, hesitated to introduce or expand nuclear power.

Another factor that had come sharply into focus since 1985 was the fear that even the current level of use of coal, oil and gas threatened to raise the temperature of the world's atmosphere. While the emissions of sulphur dioxide (SO_2) and nitrogen oxides (NO_x) from the burning of fossil fuels could, at a cost, be drastically reduced by technical means to avoid further destruction of forests and lakes, there was no economically viable way to avoid carbon dioxide (CO_2) emissions from the processes involved. Conservation and greater reliance on renewable resources of energy alone were insufficient to resolve the dilemma of generating more electricity while reducing CO_2 emissions into the atmosphere. Clearly the use of nuclear power was not a panacea, but the significant and technically reliable CO_2-free option could not be ignored.

For the developing countries, that perspective must be closely scrutinized. It was not a matter of indifference if China, already the world's largest coal consumer, doubled its use of coal by the year 2000 instead of stepping up its reliance on nuclear power; if India and Pakistan, currently not parties to the NPT, but advanced in nuclear techniques, made much greater use of those techniques to cover their energy needs instead of drawing more heavily upon fossil fuels; if rapidly developing countries, such as Indonesia and Thailand, or, for that matter, Egypt and a number of Latin American countries, including the non-NPT States of Argentina and Brazil, turned increasingly to fossil energy rather than to nuclear energy; and if new power plants in industrialized countries were fossil- rather than nuclear-fuelled. Interest in the nuclear power option would inevitably increase if, as seemed likely, the scientific evidence of the greenhouse effect grew. Political events giving rise to uncertainty about oil or gas

supplies would also increase awareness that nuclear power, with the small volumes of fuel that it required and that could be stored for long periods of operation, enhanced energy independence.

Renewed interest in nuclear power would focus on whether the new technology could be made so safe as to convince the public that accidents involving any significant releases of radioactivity could be virtually ruled out and that high-level waste was being isolated so safely that any significant releases could, for all intents and purposes, be excluded. Promising technological activity was under way in both those crucial areas. Already, much improved nuclear power plant designs existed for the most common reactor types. Efforts were being made to build smaller, less expensive and more simply designed power reactors that would be easier to operate and would rely more heavily on passive safety. Several designs of that nature were being developed, improving the chances of finding a moderate-sized and moderately priced CO_2-free source of electricity for developing countries. Universal adherence to the non-proliferation régime would facilitate world-wide dissemination of such new technology.

When looking forward to the crucial date of 1995, the Conference should bear in mind three interrelated factors: the need for universal adherence to the non-proliferation régime and for drastic global disarmament, including nuclear disarmament; the need for an increased transfer of nuclear technology, including simpler and more passively safe nuclear power plants, to promote development; and the need for better protection of the environment, including the importance of counteracting global warming and acid rain, and the relevance of the nuclear option in achieving that goal.

A dangerous confrontation was taking place in a strategic region of the world. Conflicts remained in other regions too. However, a new climate of co-operation improved chances for alleviating or resolving many difficult regional disputes and achieving very substantial global disarmament, and it also gave hope that greater and better use would be made of the international institutions, the United Nations and the specialized agencies, including the IAEA, which were indispensable instruments for tackling many global problems. In such a climate, it was not too much to hope that universal adherence to the non-proliferation régime might become a reality. Such adherence would set the stage for promoting the transfer of nuclear power technology on a universal basis. It would serve the cause of development, and all States and the global environment would benefit as well.

ADOPTION OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE (agenda item 4)

Ms. ESCALER (Philippines) congratulated the Chairman on his election and, speaking on behalf of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), said that, on 7 May 1990, ASEAN had addressed a letter to the Chairmen of the Preparatory Committee rejecting the reference to the "People's Republic of Kampuchea" in document NPT/CONF.IV/PC.III/18/Rev.1 and requesting rectification of the situation and circulation for information of copies of the ASEAN letter to the Depositaries and States Parties to the Treaty. ASEAN profoundly regretted that the instrument of accession in question had been accepted in the first place, because the "People's Republic of Kampuchea", which had been installed by foreign armed intervention, was not recognized as the legal representative of Cambodia. Such a decision was unacceptable.

ASEAN was actively involved in current efforts to allow the different Cambodian factions to come to an urgent agreement on the creation of a supreme national council as a vehicle for achieving national reconciliation and a comprehensive political solution to the Cambodian problem. The supreme national council must consist of representatives of all shades of political opinion which had support among the Cambodian people.

Mr. LUONG MINH (Viet Nam) said that his Government recognized the State of Cambodia, formerly the People's Republic of Kampuchea, as the sole legitimate representative of Cambodia, and considered that only the State of Cambodia could represent Cambodia in international relations, including international conferences and treaties. Viet Nam therefore recognized the State of Cambodia as the sole legal Cambodian party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The PRESIDENT said that, if there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference wished to adopt the draft rules of procedure as contained in annex IV to document NPT/CONF.IV/1.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT said, with reference to rule 44 of the rules of procedure, that a number of requests had been received for observer status, namely from Argentina, Brazil, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chile, China, Cuba, France, Israel, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the United Republic of Tanzania. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference decided to accept the requests.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT said, with reference to rule 44 (4) of the rules of procedure, concerning specialized agencies and regional intergovernmental organizations, that the following organizations had requested observer status: the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Commission of the European Community. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference decided to grant the requests.

It was so decided.

ELECTION OF CHAIRMEN AND VICE-CHAIRMEN OF THE MAIN COMMITTEES, THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE AND THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE (agenda item 5)

The PRESIDENT said that, at the third session of the Preparatory Committee, candidacies for the Chair of each of the three Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee had been approved unanimously, namely Main Committee I: Chairman: Mr. Adeyemi (Nigeria), Vice-Chairmen: Mr. Ditchev (Bulgaria) and Mr. Vaerno (Norway); Main Committee II: Chairman: Mr. Strulak (Poland), Vice-Chairmen: Mr. Villarroel (Philippines) and Mr. Meerburg (Netherlands); Main Committee III: Chairman: Mr. Yamada (Japan), Vice-Chairmen: representatives from the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and from Egypt; Drafting Committee: Chairman: Mr. Hyltenius (Sweden), Vice-Chairmen: representatives from Canada and from Hungary; Credentials Committee: Chairman: Mr. Groop (Finland), Vice-Chairman: Mr. Grozdanov (Bulgaria). If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference decided to adopt those nominations. The election of the other Vice-Chairman and the other members of the Credentials Committee would be reconsidered under agenda item 7. Consultations on that subject would continue, and he would inform the Conference at the appropriate time.

It was so decided.

ELECTION OF VICE-PRESIDENTS (agenda item 6)

The PRESIDENT said that, under rule 5 of the rules of procedure, the Conference must elect 26 Vice-Presidents. As no names had been proposed yet, he suggested waiting until a complete list, which could be expected the next day, was submitted.

CONFIRMATION OF THE NOMINATION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (agenda item 8)

The PRESIDENT said that, at the first session of the Preparatory Committee, it had been decided to invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in consultation with the members of the Preparatory Committee, to nominate an official to act on behalf of the Committee as provisional Secretary-General of the Review Conference. On 16 October 1989, the Secretary-General had nominated Mr. Arpád Prandler to that position, and the Preparatory Committee had taken note of the fact at its third session. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference decided to confirm the nomination.

It was so decided.

Mr. PRANDLER (Secretary-General of the Fourth Review Conference) thanked the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for confirming his nomination and assured the Conference that he would do everything he could to ensure the smooth operation of work. He was fully conscious of the significance of the Fourth Review Conference, which would affect the implementation of and commitment to the objectives and provisions of the Treaty in the years ahead.

ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA (agenda item 9)

The CHAIRMAN said that, if there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference approved the provisional agenda as contained in annex II to document NPT/CONF.IV/1, including the recommendation of the Preparatory Committee in annex III for the allocation of items to the three Main Committees.

It was so decided.

PROGRAMME OF WORK (agenda item 10)

The PRESIDENT briefly drew attention to matters of procedure concerning the programme of work.

ADOPTION OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR MEETING THE COSTS OF THE CONFERENCE (agenda item 11)

The PRESIDENT drew the attention of the Conference to the communication that the Secretary-General of the Conference had received from the Comptroller's Office in New York stating that, owing to the current financial situation of the Organization and in accordance with Financial Rule 114.3, the United Nations would be unable to incur the financial costs without the corresponding advance contributions from the participating States,

as already indicated in paragraph 18 of document NPT/CONF.IV/PC.III/16, of 28 March 1990. Total revised costs of the Conference and its preparation had been estimated at approximately $2.8 million. To date, a total of $1.1 million had been received. If no additional payments were made, the services for the Conference meetings would have to be adjusted accordingly, and he therefore made an urgent appeal to delegations for the corresponding payment to be made before 27 August. In view of the precarious financial situation, if additional financial contributions were not received he would be unable to prepare an appropriate working programme, and the duration of the Conference would have to be modified as a consequence.

The meeting rose at 4.55 p.m.